DOE-Idaho Bi-Weekly Operations Summary
Issued September 12, 2006
For the Period of August 21-September 3, 2006
A review of past biweekly Operations Summaries revealed some Occurrence Reports that were inadvertently omitted. For the purpose of complete and thorough reporting, these reports are summarized below:
Previous Reports – Inadvertently Omitted
Environmental Management
Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP)
May 4: During a lifting operation, one of the load bearing outriggers of a mobile crane broke through the concrete platform. The operator felt the crane shift and immediately placed the load on the ground. Subsequently, the crane was placed in a safe configuration, appropriate notifications were made, and the crane was removed from service. A post-job review was performed.
(EM-ID–CWI-TAN-2006-0004)
Nuclear Energy
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
January 31: An INL bus collided with a dump truck outside of Blackfoot, Idaho. The bus driver sustained injuries and was admitted to a local hospital for two days. There were no other injuries. The dump truck driver was cited by the Idaho State Police. (NE-ID–BEA- CFA-2006-0002)
March. 10: A potential issue related to semi-annual calibration of a stack effluent monitoring system at the Fuel Conditioning Facility was identified by technical staff. No safety degradation had taken place. A critique was conducted and the calibrations appropriately rectified.
(NE-ID–BEA-FCF-2006-0001)
April 25: Researchers at the Reactor Technology Complex had concerns over the level of tritium contained in the tritium plasma experiment when they encountered unexpected levels of off-gassed tritium during experiments. The levels of off-gassed tritium suggested the presence of more tritium than was identified by the shipping manifest when the experiment was transferred to INL from Los Alamos National Laboratory. A critique confirmed that there was more tritium than anticipated and the amount exceeded the transportation limits. The off-gas, however, did not exceed any facility limits and the amounts of tritium present did not cause any of the facility limits to be exceeded.
(NE- ID–BEA-RTC-2006-0002)
June 7: The Design Basis Reconstitution (DBR) team discovered a minor calculation error in the high pressure set point of the Advanced Test Reactor plant protection system. When primary coolant system pressure increased to a pre-determined value, the ATR core and several pumps are shutdown automatically. Due to the inaccuracy, the automatic shutdown may have been slightly delayed. The miscalculation was of such small magnitude, it was determined that no additional controls or limits were required for the continued operation of the ATR. The DBR is an effort to search for and correct errors and inconsistencies in the design of the ATR. Similar DBRs have been conducted on numerous commercial nuclear reactors. (NE-ID–BEA-ATR-2006-0006)
July 18: A white paste-like material was encountered while installing a new door lock at a facility at the Materials and Fuel Complex. The material was suspected to contain asbestos. The asbestos inspector and an industrial hygienist took samples of the substance and monitored the air. The analysis confirmed the presence of asbestos and indicated a level of 0.0036 fibers/cubic centimeter (cc), which is well below the OSHA exposure limit of 0.1 fiber/cc. Work was stopped, and the door openings were taped to prevent a further release of any asbestos material.
(NE-ID–BEA-MFC-2006-0002)
Environmental Management
Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP)
Summary of Occurrence Reports
(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)
No new reportable items.
Operational Status
Through August 26, a cumulative total of 12,051 cubic meters of transuranic waste has been shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. AMWTP made 20 waste shipments during the week ending August 26.
Environmental Management
Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP)
Summary of Occurrence Reports
(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)
August 22: Errant instrument calibrations for Constant Air Monitors at the Accelerated Retrieval Project caused technicians at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) to suspect the labeling of externally procured certified calibration sources. The sources are disk-shaped sealed samples used to calibrate detection systems designed to protect worker safety. Mislabeled sources could cause errant calibrations, which can cause alarms to sound above or below their intended thresholds. Analysis at RWMC indicated that the source material was incorrectly labeled plutonium-239 when the source material was actually plutonium-238. This analysis was confirmed at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, and the vendor of the sources has been contacted and other actions taken to resolve the issue. (EM-ID–CWI-RWMC-2006-0019)
August 29: While connecting a tool to a crane in the fuel storage area, the operator’s finger was pinched between the rack and the tool when the tool shifted. The injured operator safely exited the contamination area. The operator was treated and released from a local hospital. Fuel handling operations were temporarily placed on hold until it was verified that there was no damage to the tools. (EM-ID–CWI-FUELRCSTR-2006-0014)
August 30: Three shipping incidents over a three-month period led to a review of shipping
operations by CH2M-WG Idaho, LLC (CWI). The contractor instituted an interim review process of shipping operations and documentation and chartered the Radioactive Waste Management Complex Packaging and Transportation recovery team to address this potential weakness.
(EM-ID–CWI-RWMC-2006-0020)
Operational Status
There are no reportable items.
Nuclear Energy
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Summary of Occurrence Reports
(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)
August 21: During nonroutine maintenance on several Advanced Test Reactor switchgear and motor control centers, the systems control panel was placed under Lockout/Tagout (LO/TO). During a control panel recheck an energized power source was found. Work was immediately stopped. A critique was held and the cause was identified prior to work restarting.
(NE-ID–BEA-ATR-2006-0013)
August 22: Neutron Radiography Reactor operations were being performed when an automatic reactor shutdown occurred. No observable failure was identified. The reactor was restarted by reactor operations personnel following verification that the high voltage power supply spurious alarm was clear and operational checks of the reactor protective circuits were completed satisfactorily. Reactor operations personnel did not notify management immediately and did not obtain permission for continued operation. As a result, the reactor has been shut down and cannot be restarted without line management authority. A critique is being performed. (NE-ID–BEA-NRAD-2006-0001)
August 23: It was discovered that the Advanced Test Reactor’s Safety Analysis Report did not fully analyze the bounding of accidents for reflector aging. A Potentially Inadequate Safety Analysis was identified after this discovery. Compensatory measures were taken, appropriate notifications were made, and an Unreviewed Safety Question Determination was initiated.
(NE-ID–BEA-ATR-2006-0014)
August 23: A Potentially Inadequate Safety Analysis condition was identified at the Materials and Fuels Complex regarding deficiencies in the Documented Safety Analyses. Appropriate compensatory measures were initiated. (NE-ID–BEA-MFC-2006-0005)
August 28: Part of the ongoing Advanced Test Reactor Design Basis Reconstitution Program includes review of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and supporting calculations. This review has resulted in a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis in Section 15.6, “Decrease in Primary Coolant Inventory.” One of the supporting calculations had several deficiencies. The calculations will be corrected and changes made. Interim controls have been established to assure secondary coolant system activity remains within the controlled limits. (NE-ID–BEA-ATR-2006-0015)
August 30: During installation of a wall mounted thermostat, a worker inadvertently drilled a hole in a fire extinguisher mounted on the opposite side of the wall. Prior to starting work, all pre-work procedures were followed. The contents of the breached fire extinguisher emptied into the fire extinguisher box and did not make contacted with the worker or anyone else. No one was injured. Work was immediately stopped and a critique performed. The critique resulted in a change to work procedures. (NE-ID–BEA-CFA-2006-0006)
Operational Status
There are no reportable items.