DOE-Idaho Operations Summary
Issued May 18, 2006
DOE-Idaho Bi-Weekly Operations Summary
For the Period of May 1-14, 2006

Environmental Management

Summary of Occurrence Reports

(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)

April 20: While observing the repair of a fan at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, an operator discovered that an improper circuit breaker had been tagged out of service. The repair work was discontinued, and all work requiring lockout of an electrical system was halted until retraining was completed. (EM-ID-BBWI-AMWTF-2006-0013)

May 4: A shipment of radioactive waste left the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center destined to the Pacific EcoSolutions (PEcoS) facility in the state of Washington. The shipment was surveyed by radiological control technicians prior to departure and was determined to comply with Department of Transportation (DOT) shipping requirements. At the Washington state port of entry, the shipment was surveyed and the radiation levels were determined to be in excess of the DOT limits at two meters. PEcoS personnel assisted the Idaho Site to resolve this issue by providing shielding to reduce the radiation levels to within the DOT two-meter limits. Washington port of entry
personnel then allowed the shipment to proceed to its final destination at the PEcoS facility. Port of entry personnel noted that the Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest was missing the notation ‘exclusive use’, and that the driver had not received exclusive use instructions. Idaho Packaging & Transportation personnel faxed the exclusive use instructions, and the manifest was corrected. No citations were issued. Further evaluation and discussion of the different types of instruments, and conditions are being conducted to rectify the variance in readings.

May 8: While performing a review of maintenance for safety significant systems at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, it was noted that there was a gap in the six- month surveillance requirement time period for the Real-time Radioscopy (RTR) units. Further investigation determined that a six-month Limiting Condition for Operation surveillance requirement for the two WMF-610 RTRs was not completed per maintenance instructions. Verification of the required surveillance checks for the WMF- 634 RTR units was completed, made current, and posted. Notifications were made to the contractor’s management and to DOE. A fact finding meeting was also scheduled.
(EM- ID–BBWI-AMWTF-2006-0014)

May 8: While handling fuel at CPP-666 (Fuel Storage Facility), fuel handling operators noticed that a fuel storage compartment lid, other than the one being worked on, was not in the closed position, as required by Safety Analysis Report (SAR)-113 “CPP-666 Storage Area.” The requirement to have storage compartment lids closed provides protection against potential drop scenarios. This discovery did not impact facility safety but represented a reduction in the multiple layers of safety. Fuel handling was immediately stopped, and it was confirmed that all fuel was in a safe storage configuration. A USQ was performed and the rack cover in pool 1 was reset.
(EM-ID– CWI-FUELRCSTR-2006-0010)

May 11: Decontamination & Demolition (D&D) employees at Test Area North found a yellow nut with a broken bolt attached to it lying on the road. It was recognized that the bolt/nut had come from a piece of D&D heavy equipment. They notified the TAN safety and health manager who then notified the safety engineer at the Loss-of-Fluid-Test Facility area where most of the equipment was being used. Inspection of the heavy equipment found that a newly leased articulating dump truck had three of the twelve lug nuts/bolts broken off and the other 9 nuts were loose (hand tight) on the left-front wheel. A heavy equipment mechanic took all articulating dump trucks out of service pending an
inspection. Most of the trucks, after inspection, were returned to service. Both newly leased units, however, are being kept out of service until the manufacturer’s vendor representative can complete an inspection. Upon completion of that inspection and repairs made, as necessary, these units may be returned to service. (EM-ID–CWI-TAN-2006-0005)
Operational Status
Waste Shipments from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico through May 6, 20006, now total 10,030 cubic meters of transuranic (TRU) waste. This total includes the ‘3,100 Cubic Meters Project,’ that has been already shipped to WIPP. For the week ending May 20, 18 shipments are planned. The FY 2006 HEPA filter leach treatment milestone of 26 cubic meters for the Idaho Site Treatment Plan (STP) was achieved. Filter leach operations will now proceed ahead of schedule for the FY 2007 STP milestone.

Nuclear Energy

Summary of Occurrence Reports

(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)

May 1: A Battelle Energy Alliance heavy equipment operator (HEO) was in process of releasing a chain binder on a loaded flatbed trailer when the handle of the chain binder struck the HEO on the right wrist. He continued to work, thinking the injury was not serious. The pain worsened and at the end of the day the HEO reported to the Central Facilities Area (CFA) medical facility for evaluation. An X-ray showed his wrist was broken. He was advised to visit an orthopedic specialist, who put a cast on his arm. The HEO returned to work with work restrictions. A critique of the event was scheduled. (NE-ID–BEA-CFA-2006-0004)

May 9: The MFC Facility Representative discovered a programmable logic controller (PLC) panel open, with Lockout Tag out controls (LO/TO) applied to circuits within the cabinet, and left unattended. The PLC cabinet had been designed by engineering to be “finger” safe. All personnel had been trained on the electrical hazards and were wearing the appropriate personal protection equipment for 120V circuits while performing LO/TO within the cabinet. Subsequent review by engineering revealed that a single 120V source of power was supplied to the cabinet that was not “finger” safe. The railing did not have appropriate signs that identified this potential hazard. It should be noted that personnel hanging tags in the cabinet were all aware of the potential for exposed 120V and the personal protection equipment worn is identical if the cabinet is “finger” safe or not.
Management has declared this reportable due to inadequate postings as invoked by laboratory procedures in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70E, section 130.7(16)(E)(1) and (2). (NE-ID–BEA-FCF-2006-0002)

Operational Status

Reactor Operations: The INL’s Advanced Test Reactor continues a 56-day run. This test reactor provides advanced materials testing, as well as producing an isotope of cobalt that is used for medical and industrial purposes.