DOE-Idaho Operations Summary
Issued June 5, 2006
DOE-Idaho Bi-Weekly Operations Summary
For the Period of May 15-28, 2006
Environmental Management
Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP)
Summary of Occurrence Reports
(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)
May 15: During the process of moving and retrieving boxes from the waste stack on Pad 1 in the Transuranic Storage Area – Retrieval Enclosure, a vent pipe from behind one of the boxes fell, striking the retrieval employee on the shoulder and hitting the man lift work basket. Vent pipes are positioned in the stack while the containers are loaded for storage to vent the stack. The employee was evaluated by a nurse and released to return to work with no restrictions. The work basket was sent to maintenance for evaluation before being put back to use.
(EM-ID-BBWI-AMWTF-2006-0015)
May 22: While operators were stacking fiberglass reinforced plywood waste boxes in a waste storage module, one of the operators noted that the first row of boxes was stacked four high instead of the normal three high. The crew team leader was notified, and he directed that these stacks be reduced to normal three high. While repositioning the boxes, a breaking noise was heard and a first row box was observed to be bulging and falling apart. Operations were immediately halted. The first stack of boxes was then observed to be leaning against and supported by the wall of the storage module. Radiological technicians surveyed the operators and found the gloves and orange safety vest of one operator had elevated readings. The readings were later determined to be naturally
occurring radon, not related to the breached box. The area was secured and ventilation shut down. No active continuous air monitor alarm was observed. Initial and subsequent surveys showed no radiological or hazardous materials release. (EM-ID-BBWI- AMWTF-2006-0016)
Environmental Management Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP)
May 19: Nuclear Material Disposition personnel performing canister change out operations, identified a number of concerns. None of the concerns, individually, would result in a specific ORPS reportable event. However, collectively they are reported as a management concern because of their number and the need to pursue corrective actions. Specifically, there were three issues requiring Potentially Inadequate Safety Analysis screenings to be performed. The screenings involved improperly fastened canister lids, a discovery that two canister lids designed specifically for transport were inadvertently utilized for fuel storage, and the discovery during an inspection that canister lid locking pins were not fully engaged, as required. Operations were suspended, a Nonconformance
Report was generated, and the Unreviewed Safety Question process was initiated.
(EM- ID–CWI-FUELRCSTR-2006-0011)
May 22: While performing work associated with dewatering and grouting of the CPP-603 basins, some of the pipe fittings were identified as being suspect/counterfeit items. A nonconformance report was issued. The fittings will be removed and replaced with quality-approved fittings.
(EM-ID–CWI-LANDLORD-2006-0003)
May 24: Laboratory personnel preparing for the dewatering and grouting of the CPP-603 Basins discovered that suspect/counterfeit piping adapters were to be used. Appropriate notifications were made. The adapters will be replaced, and a Nonconformance Report was generated.
(EM-ID–CWI-LANDLORD-2006-0004)
Operational Status
Final readiness to resume exhumation operations for the Accelerated Retrieval Project was verified subsequent to completion of the Idaho Completion Project contractor’s Management Self Assessment and DOE-ID’s Line Management Assessment. Exhumation operations commenced on May 11, 2006.
Nuclear Energy
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Summary of Occurrence Reports
(Note: Date below indicates when notification was made of the incident)
May 16: Prior to loading a flatbed trailer at the Specific Manufacturing Capability
(SMC) facility, a pre-use contamination survey revealed two small areas of fixed contamination on the wooden bed. The higher of the two was 58,000 decays per minute. A subsequent gamma spectrometry survey by a qualified BEA measuring and modeling technician was inconclusive as to the isotope, but revealed that the material did not originate at the SMC or INL. The contaminated area on the trailer bed was covered with plastic and the trailer was kept inside the SMC TAN-682 warehouse. An isotopic analysis will be made. (NE-ID–BEA-SMC-2006-0003)
May 18: In a letter dated May 15, 2006, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality issued a Notice of Violation with a proposed civil penalty of $101,850 resulting from an inspection at the Materials and Fuels Complex on February 21-24, 2006. There were a total of 18 alleged violations cited; all but one was corrected within few weeks of the inspection. Neither worker health nor the environment was impacted by the alleged violations. Appropriate management notifications were made, and initial actions to mitigate the violations were performed.
(NE-ID–BEA-MFC-2006-0001)
May 18: During excavation activities at the Reactor Technology Complex, one of a group of 13 separate direct buried electrical wires was severed by a backhoe. Work was immediately stopped. The electrical job supervisor was contacted and zero energy checks were performed on the exposed cable wires. The severed cable was found to be de-energized. A critique was held. RTC engineering and maintenance personnel determined that the thirteen electrical cables were nonfunctional alarm wiring for the firewater post indicator valves removed from service 1980.
(NE-ID–BEA-RTC-2006- 0003)
May 22: During routine plant observations, it was noted that an unused Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel element storage position was moving laterally approximately 1/2 inch. Movement was most likely induced by the flow from the canal recycle system. At the time, no other storage positions were noted to be moving and this condition was treated as a material deficiency. An extent of conditions review was performed and two additional storage positions were found to move greater than the design dimensional tolerance (1/32 inch). Initial assessment indicates that due to the large amount of conservatism built into the criticality safety evaluation for the fuel storage grid, this small
amount of lateral movement poses no threat to criticality safety and no interim controls are required. ATR management has removed the three storage locations from service until a new detailed criticality analysis of the grid is completed. (NE-ID–BEA-ATR- 2006-0005)
Operational Status
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Education, Training and Research Directorate held a 2- day workshop on “Revitalizing Nuclear Education in the United States.” The first day of the workshop focused on undergraduate education, and the second day focused on preparation needed in pre-college education. The workshop was attended by representation from the University of Idaho, Idaho State University, Boise State University, Eastern Idaho Technical College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, North Carolina State University, Oregon State University, University of New Mexico, several local school districts, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, several nonprofit organizations, and others. The workshop will result in a series of recommendations on how to better prepare students to work in the nuclear power industry and related research.